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DIGITAL PILLOW TALK?:
WAIVING MARITAL PRIVILEGE AT WORK IN

UYITED STATES v HAMIL TON
1.

INTRODUCTION

In 1839, the United States Supreme Court first applied the marital
communications privilege, calling marriage "the best solace of human
existence." The marital communications privilege presumes communications
made between spouses were intended to be confidential and renders those
communications inadmissible in court. 2 While the marital communications
privilege has officially been part of federal common law since 1839,3 the
privilege is one of the oldest common law privileges; its roots date back to
medieval times.
The rationale behind the privilege has been explained as
fostering the sanctity of the relationship and protecting marital harmony.5
Today, rapid advancements in technology allow more professionals to work
remotely, blurring the lines between work life and personal life and creating a
new question for courts: How far will the marital communications privilege
extend in a new technological world? In 2012, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit began answering this question when it made clear
that spouses should not seek the solace of their marriages via work email on
work computers.6
Last year in United States v. Hamilton," the Fourth Circuit held that Phillip
Hamilton's emails to his wife through his work email account were not subject
to the marital privilege and, therefore, were properly admitted at trial.8
Hamilton, a member of the Virginia House of Delegates, was charged with
bribery and extortion under color of official right because he secured state
funding for a public university center in exchange for employment by the
university center.9 He was convicted and sentenced to 114 months in prison. o
Hamilton's main challenge on appeal was that certain emails admitted at trial

1.
Stein v. Bowman, 38 U.S. 209, 223 (1839).
2.
See Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 14 (1934).
3.
See Bowinan, 38 U.S. at 223; see also Katherine 0. Eldred. "Every Spouse's Evidence":
Availability of the Adverse Spousal Testimonial Privilege in Federal Civil Trials, 69 U. CHI. L. REV.
1319, 1333 (2002) (citing Trammel v. United States. 445 U.S. 40, 44 (1980)) ("The spousal
privilege first surfaced in American jurisprudence in 1839.").
4.
See Trammel, 445 U.S. at 44.
5. Id.
6.
United States v. Hamilton, 701 F.3d 404, 407, 409 (4th Cir. 2012).
7.
701 F.3d 404.
8.
See id. at 406. 409.
9.
See id. at 406-07 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B) (2006): id. § 1951).
10. Id. at 407.
I1. Hamilton also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, failure to instruct the jury on
the distinction between a bribe and a gratuity, and the application of a fourteen-level sentencing
enhancement. See id. at 409-11 (citations omitted).
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written to his wife violated the marital communications privilege." The Fourth
Circuit upheld the trial court's decision to admit the emails, affirming his
conviction and sentence. 1 3
This Comment argues that a lack of precision in this decision regarding the
test for privileged communications has created some ambiguity in the law.
Further, as daily reliance on digital communications increases, the cost to
employees may be less privacy and control over their communications. Here,
employees and employers would directly benefit from clear legal implications
when navigating how to handle potentially confidential communications at work.
However, while the courts may not have yet worked out how to confront
technological issues related to privileged communications, this Comment also
highlights the important role workplace-use policies play following this decision.

11.

BACKGROUND

Phillip Hamilton spent his career in public education;14 he was elected to the
Virginia House of Delegates in 1988, where he rose through the ranks to key
roles in the General Assembly until 2009.
In 2006, as financial troubles
mounted and a reduction in retirement benefits loomed in the background,
Hamilton attended meetings and exchanged emails with officials at Old
Dominion University (ODU) regarding securing state funding for a new center
designed to train leaders in urban school systems.16 After an August 2006
meeting, the president of ODU directed the dean of the college of education to
hire Hamilton as the director of the new center.17 In December 2006. Hamilton
emailed the president to remind her of his interest in employment and emailed
David Blackburn, the director of ODU's Program for Research and Evaluation in
Public Schools, informing him that because the governor's budget did not
include money for the Center, he would propose a budget amendment to secure
the funding. 18 Hamilton also told Blackburn, "'My City retirement is reduced in
May 2007.' 1 will need to supplement my current [public school] income ... by
at least an equal amount .

. . . '

Director Blackburn replied: 'Thanks for passing

on budget request and specific salary need[.] I believe GA [General Assembly]
will fund and you will be on board[.]"'i9
In early 2007, Hamilton introduced house amendments that did not mention
ODU. but rather would have funneled money through the United States

12. See id. at 407.
13. See id. at 411.
14. See Brief of Appellantat 18-19, Hamilton, 701 F.3d 404 (No. 11-4847).
15. See Hamilton. 701 F.3d at 406.
16. See id.; see also Brief of the United States at 9-10, Hamilton, 701 F.3d 404 (No. 114847) (discussing Hamilton's financial problems).
17. See Hamilton, 701 F.3d at 406.
18. Id.
19. Id.
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Department of Education.20 On the senate side, ODU had another advocate,
Senator Blevins, who introduced the amendment which specifically named
ODU.21 A senate legislative aide asked Hamilton if he was okay with the money
22
going through ODU; Hamilton said that was "fine.2 The budget passed with
$1,000,000 appropriated for the center, and Hamilton became the director of the
center in mid-June 2007.23 In July 2008, the senate finance committee began an
investigation. 4 Hamilton emailed Blackburn and told Blackburn to list himself
as director, noting it "looks like they are digging."

111.

HAMILTON'S EMAILS To

His

WIFE

At trial, three emails from Hamilton to his wife were admitted over
Hamilton's motion to exclude the emails.26 In the first email, dated June 5,
2006, Hamilton informed his wife that they only had $230 remaining in their
checking account.27 They also discussed whether to use the remaining money on
books for one of their children or other expenses.28 In the second email, dated
August 16, 2006, Hamilton told his wife that he expected employment to come
up at a meeting with ODU officials and he planned to ask for $6,000 a month.29
Earlier that day, Hamilton's wife asked him, "[W]hat are you going to ask
for?"30 The third email was after Hamilton's meeting at ODU on August 16,
2006; Hamilton informed his wife that the meeting went well and he "reinforced
the idea that compensation in the area of $6,000 per month and time flexibility
were important factors."'
On appeal, Hamilton argued that the emails were improperly admitted
because they were subject to the marital communications privilege.32 In
particular, Hamilton emphasized that his employer, Newport News Public
School System (NNPSS), did not have a computer-usage policy in 2006 when
the emails were sent.3 NNPSS did not enact a use policy regarding computer
usage until almost a year after the emails between Hamilton and his wife were

20. See Brief of Appellant, supra note 14, at 13.
21. See id. at 15.
22. Id at 14.
23. See id. at 21; see also Hamilton, 701 F.3d at 406 (stating that two $500,000
appropriations for the center passed).
24. See Brief of the United States, supra note 16, at 21.
25. Id. see also Hamilton, 701 F.3d at 407 (describing how Hamilton sought to conceal his
position as director).
26. See Brief of Appellant, supra note 14, at 16-17.
27. Id at 16.
28. Oral Argument at 1:05, Hamilton, 701 F.3d 404 (No. 11-4847), available at http://coop.
ca4.uscorts.gov/OAarclhive/mp 3 /11-4847-20121024.np 3 .
29. See Brief of Appellant, supra note 14, at 16.
30. Id
31. Id at 16-17 (internal quotation marks omitted).
32. See United States v. Hamilton. 701 F.3d 404, 407 (4th Cir. 2012).
33. See id. at 408.
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sent.34 When the policy was enacted in June of 2007, the policy informed users
that they had no expectation of privacy on their computers and the computers
could be inspected or monitored at any time.3 Hamilton acknowledged and
electronically signed this policy on February 1, 2008, and again on October 24,
2008.36 Additionally, in order to log onto Hamilton's school computer, he was
required to press a key to acknowledge that Internet and email access was only
for authorized use.37 Critically, this log on message also stated: "All data stored
or transmitted over this system may be monitored."3
IV. MARITAL COMMUNICATION PRIVILEGE

The marital communication privilege traditionally is evaluated by
considering four elements.
First, "there must have been a communication,
[second,] there must have been a valid marriage at the time of the
communication, [third,] the communication must have been made in confidence,
and [fourth,] the privilege must not have been waived." 40 In Hamilton, the two
elements at issue were whether the communication was confidential and whether
41
the privilege was waived.
4. Confidentiality
To reach its holding, the Fourth Circuit relied on Wolfle v. United States,42
which established the presumption that communications between spouses are
intended to be confidential and are therefore privileged . In Wolfle, a husband
dictated a letter to his wife using a stenographer who transcribed it. 4 In that
case, the Supreme Court held that the privilege did not apply to the letter
between the husband and wife because of the voluntary disclosure to the third-

34. See Brief of Appellant, supra note 14, at 40.
35. Hamilton, 701 F.3d at 408; see also Brief of the United States, supra note 16, at 37
(stating the policy).
36. See Hamilton, 701 F.3d at 408: see also Brief of the United States, supra note 16, at 38
(stating Hamilton electronically signed the policy).
37. See Hamilton, 701 F.3d at 408; see also Brief of the United States, supra note 16, at 38
(noting that every time someone logged onto the school's computer system, the user could not
bypass pressing a key to acknowledge the policy).
38. Brief of the United States, supra note 16, at 38.
39. SEC v. Lavin. 111 F.3d 921, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (citing United States v. Evans, 966
F.2d 398, 401 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Lustig, 555 F.2d 737, 747 (9th Cir. 1977)). For a
discussion ofthe historical background ofthe marital communication privilege, see generally Mikah
K. Story, liventv-first Centuy Pillow; Talk: Applicabilitv of the Marital Commnunications Privilege
to Electronic Mail. 58 S.C. L. REV. 275, 277-82 (2006).
40. Id. (citing Evans, 966 F.2d at 401: Lustig, 555 F.2d at 747).
41. See Hamilton, 701 F.3d at 407 (citing Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 13-15 (1934)).
42. 291 U.S. 7.
43. See Hamilton. 701 F.3d at 407 (quoting Wf'olfle, 291 U.S. at 14).
44. Woffle, 291 U.S. at 12.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol64/iss4/19

4

Routh: Digital Pillow Talk?: Waiving Marital Privilege at Work in United
UNITED STATES VIHAMILTON

2013]

1151

person stenographer.45
The Court noted that spouses may "conveniently
communicate without stenographic aid"4 and the privilege need not be extended
so far as to include confidences voluntarily disclosed to a third person.4 7
Comparing Hamilton's emails to the stenographer in TWole, the Fourth
Circuit stated that "email has become the modern stenographer."-4 8 In Wolfle, the
Supreme Court held that the privilege never attached because the communication
was not made in confidence. 49 Presumably, in analogizing email to the
stenographer, the Hamilton court was indicating that communications by email
are not made in confidence and therefore cannot be privileged communications.
Yet, the court acknowledged that people generally have a reasonable expectation
of privacy in email-at least where there is no use policy to the contrary-and
seemed to suggest that certain communications could be made in confidence
over email.
Borrowing again from Wolfle, the court concluded that spouses
can communicate without using work email on an office computer just like the
Supreme Court concluded that spouses can communicate without using a
stenographer.
Most courts, including the Fourth Circuit, that have examined
communications transmitted on or located on company property do so by
analyzing the employee's reasonable expectation of privacy in the
communication.52 Here, the Hamilton court implied that Hamilton did have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his email and that email generally is
intended to be private. 5
But by comparing Hamilton's emails to the
stenographer in Wolfle, and yet acknowledging Hamilton's reasonable
expectation of privacy, the opinion has left the law regarding confidential

45. Id. at 14.
46. Id. at 16.
47. See id. at 16-17.
48. Hamilton. 701 F.3d at 408.
49. See Wolfle, 291 U.S. at 13-14.
50. See Hamilton, 701 F.3d at 408. In doing so, the Court referenced an ABA Formal
Opinion. Id (quoting ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'1 Responsibility. Formal Op. 413 (1999))
("[E]nail 'pose[s] no greater risk of interception or disclosure than other modes of communication
commonly relied upon as having a reasonable expectation of privacy' and so there is generally 'a
reasonable expectation of privacy in its use.'").
51. See id; see also Wf'olfle, 291 U.S. at 16-17 (stating that the spouses could communicate
without a stenographer).
52. See, e.g., In re Royce Homes, LP, 449 B.R 709, 733 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2011) (citing
United States v. Etkin. No. 07-CR-913 (KMK), 2008 WL 482281, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20. 2008);
Long v. Marubeni Am. Corp., No. 05Civ.639(GEL)(KNF), 2006 WL 2998671, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.
19, 2006); Curto v. Med. World Commc'ns Inc.. 99 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 298, 302-05
(E.D.N.Y. 2006); Kaufman v. Sungard Inv. Sys., No. 05-cy-1236 (JLL), 2006 WL 1307882, at *4
(D.N.J. May 10, 2006): In re Asia Global Crossing, LTD., 322 B.R. 247. 255-56 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2005): Stengart v. Loving Care Agency. Inc., 990 A.2d 650, 664 (NJ. 2010); Nat'l Econ. Research
Assocs.. Inc. v. Evans. 21 Mass. L. Rptr. 337, 338 (Super. Ct. 2006)) (noting that most courts
consider an "employee's reasonable expectation ofprivacy").
53.

See Hamilton, 701 F.3d at 408.

54. See id.
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communications unclear. Going forward, the opinion seems to suggest that work
email sent from an office computer that is subject to a use policy will not be
considered confidential in the Fourth Circuit.55 Nevertheless, the question
remains, to what extent will other types of email be considered confidential, if
communications involving workplace property will be considered confidential at
all.
B.

Waiver

Turning to the waiver issue, Hamilton insisted that because there was no use
policy in place at the time the emails were written and sent, he could not
retroactively waive the privilege.
The court noted, "In an era in which email
plays a ubiquitous role in daily communications, these arguments caution against
lightly finding waiver of marital privilege by email usage."58 However, the court
placed importance on the fact that Hamilton did not take "any steps to protect the
emails in question" after the policy was in place.
In essence, once the use policy went into place, the court held Hamilton
waived the privilege (assuming one existed at the time he wrote the emails) by
not going back and attempting to delete or protect the emails.60 The court
concluded that this result was consistent "with the principle that one who is on
notice that the allegedly privileged material is subject to search may waive the
privilege when he makes no effort to protect it."6 The court noted that two other
circuits "have also made clear that a party waives the marital communications
privilege when he 'fails to take adequate precautions to maintain ...
confidentiality."'62 One of the cases the court cited was SEC v. Lavin,6 in which
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit described privileged
communications as "crown jewels" which must be zealously protected in order

55. See id.
56. The reasonable expectation of privacy analysis is also used in other employee privacy
claims. See. e.g., City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2630 (2010) (discussing the "reasonable
expectation of privacy" in the Fourth Amendment context); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709. 717
(1987) (rejecting the contention that in the Fourth Amendment context "public employees can never
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their place of work"). Therefore, while this Comment
focuses on the spousal privilege at issue in this case, this analysis could also impact other common
law privileges like the attorney-client privilege. See generally Adam C. Losey, Note, Clicking
Aiay Confidentiality: Workplace WIaiver of Attornev-Client Privilege, 60 FLA. L. REv. 1179, 1190
(2008) (discussing that whether an employee waived attorney-client privilege centers "around
whether the employee-client had an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy when
communicating with an attorney").
57. See Hamilton, 701 F.3d at 408.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See id. at 408, 409 (quoting Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 17 (1934)).
61. Id. at 409.
62. Id. (quoting SEC v. Lavin, 111 F.3d 921, 930 (D.C. Cir. 1997)).
63. 111 F.3d 921.
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to maintain the privilege.64 The test regarding waiver both the D.C. Circuit in
Lavin and the Ninth Circuit adopted is "[w]hen the disclosure of privileged
material is involuntary, we will find the privilege preserved if the privilege
holder has made efforts 'reasonably designed' to protect and preserve the
privilege."65
66
The Lavin case, which the Hamilton court referenced,6 dealt with marital
67
communications over the phone while the husband was at work.
The
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued a subpoena to Mr. Lavin
regarding an ongoin investigation of fraudulent sales practices at the bank
where Lavin worked. Lavin was not aware that telephone conversations in his
office wxere taped and seven conversations between him and his wife were
recorded.69 The district court ruled that the marital communications privilege
did not protect the conversations because the privilege had been waived.70 The
D.C. Circuit reversed that ruling and remanded, holding that the Lavins had done
all they could reasonably be expected to do to protect the privilege.
The court noted that even though Mr. Lavin had learned of his line being
recorded five to seven months prior, he was not obligated to recollect every
conversation he had with his wife during that time and "assert the
privilege . . . anticipating production requests by third parties."72 Moreover, the
court reasoned that even if Lavin could have reasonably foreseen an
investigation, there is no case which requires a privilege holder to preemptively
"strike" without a "concrete threat of disclosure." ' Finally, "The inadvisability
of adopting an affirmative duty is clear given the difficulties that arise in
determining what would constitute sufficient preemptive measures .... Rules of
privilege are designed to afford its holder the right to protect himself or herself
against the use of privileged materials in legal proceedings ...... Put simply,
the court determined the Lavins had asserted the privilege as soon as there was
known potential disclosure to a third party and this assertion was adequate
protection to maintain the privilege. 7
In the present case, before the use policy was instituted, Hamilton stored his
personal emails in folders labeled "personal" and later organized them by month

64.
quotation
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
921).
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 929 (quoting In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1989)) (internal
marks omitted).
Id. at 930 (quoting United States v. De La Jara. 973 F.2d 746. 750 (9th Cir. 1992)).
See H-anilton, 701 F.3d at 409.
See Lavin. 111 F.3d at 923.
Id.
See id. at 923 24.
See id. at 929 (citing SEC v. Lavin, 937 F. Supp. 23, 30 (D.D.C. 1996), rev'd, 11I F.3d
Id. at 930. 933.
Id. at 931.
Id.
Id.

75. See id. at 930.
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and year after the use policy was instituted."6 According to the court, Hamilton
did not do anything after he was on notice of the use policy to protect his emails
from being disclosed] 7 Thus, Hamilton arguably establishes an affirmative duty
on privilege holders to take action to protect privileged communications. In
particular, the court, at oral argument, was interested in why Hamilton did not
delete the emails once the use policy went into effect. 8 Ultimately, the court
emphasized the fact that he had not tried to delete the emails and determined this
fact meant he had not done enough to protect his privileged communications.
As the Lavin court cautioned,80 the question now is: What will be sufficient to
protect a privileged communication once it already exists in written or digital
form? The Hamilton court seemed to suggest that at least attempting to delete
the emails would have made a difference;81 here, this would have required
Hamilton to either spend time going through each email written prior to the
policy, or recalling, finding, and deleting specific emails that he intended to be
confidential.
V.

PROTECTING THE "CROWN JEWELS" AT WORK: WHAT UNITED STATES V.
HA1IILTOVMEANS FOR EMPLOYEES AND EMPLOYERS

Hamilton may serve as a cautionary tale for both employees and
employers.82 First, this case highlights what commentators have noted is a
tremendous knowledge gap between employees and employers.
Despite use
policies and acknowledgement of these policies, many employees continue to
comingle personal and business matters from their work emails and computers. 84
When a policy disclaims any expectation of privacy for the employee, the
employee should acknowledge this disclaimer, and the information should be
provided to the employee in multiple ways as the school system did in this
case. Employers should also consider ways to mitigate the knowledge gap by
adopting clear, easy to understand use policies and holding training sessions that
outline the practical implications of such policies.
Second. the Hamilton decision may comfort employers that have not
instituted a use policy because, according to this opinion, creating or updating a

76. Oral Argument at 21:30, United States v. Hamilton. 701 F.3d 404 (2012) (No. 11-4847),
availableat http://coop.ca4.uscourts.gov/OAarchive/inp3/11-4847-20121024.mp 3 .
77. See Hamilton, 701 F.3d at 408.
78. See Oral Argument at 32:10, Hamilton, 701 F.3d 404 (No. 11-4847), available at
http://coop.ca4.uscourts.gov/OAarchive/mp 3 /11-4847-20121024.np3.
79. See Hamvilton, 701 F.3d at 408.
80. See Lawn, Ill F.3d at 931.
81. See Hamilton. 701 F.3d at 408.
82. It also serves as a warning that legislators should avoid taking bribes, or at least the
appearance of impropriety, lest they also potentially face a similar nine-year prison sentence.
83. See Losey, supra note 56, at 1201.
84. See id.
85. See Hamilton. 701 F.3d at 408.
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use policy in the future may protect employees' actions taken in the past.86
While the old axiom still rings true that "retroactivity is not favored in the
law,"87 companies enjoy the flexibility to alter their use policies and provide
some protection in the future for communications that may have taken place in
the past. The school system's policy explicitly notified employees that data
stored on the computer was subject to monitoring." Without such notice, it is
possible that the outcome here would have been different. On the other hand.
employees should be cautioned that an expectation of privacy may still be
forfeited if they do not do enough to protect those communications, and changes
in workplace use policies could have real effects on previous communications.
Finally, the Hamilton court noted that the surest way to avoid privileged
communication problems of the sort highlighted in the appeal is to refrain from
communicating with one's spouse via work email. 89 However, the court also
seemed to recognize that work demands in our technology-driven world are
movinc closer to twenty-four-hour-a-day, seven-day-a-week accessibility to
work.9 Employees, especially those who are unaware of what they are risking,
put too much at stake when they try to have confidential communication at
work.91 However, whether this wall of separation between work and personal
confidential communications will withstand further scrutiny remains to be seen.
There are legitimate questions to be asked about whether this separation is
realistic given today's technology and work demands.92 Until the law and the
workplace provide clearer boundaries on how to successfully integrate personal
life with work life without putting privilege at risk, pillow talk between spouses
is best left for the pillow.
Jennifer Butler Routh

86. See id.
87. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 264 (1994) (quoting Bowen v. Georgetown
Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
88. See Briefof the United States, supra note 16, at 38.
89. See Hamilton. 701 F.3d at 408.
90. See id. ("In an era in wvhich email plays a ubiquitous role in daily communications, these
arguments caution against lightly finding wavier of marital privilege by email usage.").
91. See, e.g., Michael L. Green, Against Emnplover Dumpster-Divingfor Email, 64 S.C. L.
REV. 323, 365 (2012) (discussing the how attorney client communication via email is changing
attorney-client privilege implications with regard to reasonable expectations of privacy).
92. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
(noting that "it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties ... This approach is ill
suited to the digital age . . . .").
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